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Tort Immunity of Minor Governmental Officers
Morton L. Kaplan*
T HIS NOTE CONCERNS the issues which the courts, both state
and federal, have considered in proffering the cloak of im-
munity to minor public officers, and the current trends toward
the extension, narrowing or maintenance of the doctrine of im-
munity.
Public Policy
The rationale which underlines the protection of govern-
ment officers from civil suit is public policy.'
Every act executed by the officer may well affect some citi-
zen adversely, and ultimately result in some real or fancied in-
jury. Whether such injury deserves redress cannot be de-
termined until the case has been litigated.2 To submit every act
and officer to the burden of impending suit would very likely
produce chaos, and would certainly result in some dereliction
of duty.3
It is felt that to let the guilty go unpunished and the injured
suffer in silence is preferable to subjection of both guilty and
innocent public officers to the threat of suit.4
The conflict then, is between the protection of the private
citizen from the acts of the public officer in the malicious, neg-
ligent, or even faultless performance of his duties, and the harass-
ment of the public officer by the actually injured, vindictively
impelled, or paranoically motivated private citizen.5
The case for the protection of governmental officers under
the cloak of immunity is set forth by Judge Learned Hand in
Gregoire v. Biddle:
The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know
whether the claim is well founded until the case has been
tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as
* B.A., Pennsylvania State Univ.; Second-year student at Cleveland-Mar-
shall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Norton v. McShane, 332 F. 2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964).
2 Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
3 Rottkamp v. Young, 21 A. D. 2d 373, 249 N. Y. S. 2d 334 (1964); Phelps v.
Dawson, 97 F. 2d 339 (8th Cir. 1938).
4 Blitz v. Boog, 328 F. 2d 596 (2d Cir. 1964).
5 Norton v. McShane, supra n. 1.
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the guilty, to the burden of trial and to the inevitable danger
to its outcome would dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching dis-
charge of their duties . . In this instance it has been
thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs
done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try
to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation. 6
Scope of Authority
Again and again the cases turn on the sometimes delicate
question of whether the officer was acting within the scope of
his duty.7 Immunity does not protect the officer who acts out-
side the scope of his duty or authority, and he is liable as if
he were a private citizen.8 However, acts which are performed
within the scope of authority or duty do not subject the officer
to liability for injuries incurred as a result of that act.9 The
officer is protected from suit in his personal capacity under these
circumstances. 10
The federal courts seem to give a liberal interpretation of
the scope of an officer's duty or authority.1 It is sufficient if
the act be more or less within the officer's authority, that it be
done under color of his office, 12 and that the act be not clearly
and obviously beyond his sphere of control. 13 Nor is it necessary
that the act be dictated by statute or be the result of a directive
from a superior, but it is considered sufficient if the act in ques-
tion is required in view of the officer's duties. 14 Even acts done
or statements made in "the outer perimeter" of an officer's duty
will be protected.15 Similarly, the state courts also seem to give
a broad interpretation to an officer's scope of authority. For
6 Gregoire v. Biddle, supra n. 2 at 581.
7 Hughes v. Johnson, 305 F. 2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962); Colpoys v. Gates, 118 F.
2d 16 (D. C. Cir. 1941); Thibodeax v. Thibodeax, 46 La. Ann. 1528, 16 So.
450 (1894); Thurlow v. Crossman, 336 Mass. 248, 143 N. E. 2d 812 (1957).
8 67 C. J. S., Officers § 126; Garrett v. Jones, 200 Okla. 696, 200 P. 2d 402
(1948); Robinson v. Johnson, 239 F. 671 (8th Cir. 1917).
9 Morris v. Nowotny, 323 S. W. 2d 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
10 67 C. J. S., Officers § 125.
11 Preble v. Johnson, 275 F. 2d 275 (10th Cir. 1960); Gregoire v. Biddle,
supra n. 2.
12 Smith v. O'Brien, 88 F. 2d 769 (D. C. Cir. 1937); DeBusk v. Harvin, 212
F. 2d 143 (5th Cir. 1954).
13 Denman v. White, 316 F. 2d 524 (1st Cir. 1963).
14 43 Am. Jur., Public Officers § 273; Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F. 2d
257 (4th Cir. 1950).
15 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 79 S. Ct. 1335 (1959).
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example, officers who are immune do not lose this immunity
when they act in concert with persons not protected. 16 Acts
which are tangential to, but which nevertheless promote the
ultimate accomplishment of the principal purpose, are included,
as well as those falling squarely within the scope of duty.'7
It should be noted in this connection that acting within his
power (to be entitled to immunity) cannot be more than
that the occasion must be such as would have justified the
act, if he had been using his power for any of the purposes
on whose account it was vested in him.' 8
In some states, no distinction is drawn between acts done
colore officii, or virtute officii. 19
Malice or Ulterior Motives
The question here considered is: how broadly has the term
"scope of authority" been interpreted by the courts, state and
federal? Can the malicious act of a government officer be in-
terpreted as being within the scope of his authority?
Within the federal courts the issue appears to be clearly
resolved. In 1896 the Supreme Court of the United States in the
leading case of Spalding v. Vilas,2 held that an officer deserving
of the cloak of immunity is so clothed in spite of his act or acts
being maliciously motivated. From this initial foundation, suc-
ceeding cases have been heaped one upon the other, building up
a wall of immunity which cannot be surmounted by allegations
of malice or ulterior motive for acts done in the performance of
duty.21 Consider the practical application of this situation in
Taylor v. Glotfelty,2 2 where a psychiatrist in the employ of the
federal government was found to be immune from civil suit
brought by a patient whom the psychiatrist, impelled by (al-
leged) ulterior motives, declared mentally incompetent.
16 Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal. 2d 577, 311 P. 2d 494 (1957).
17 White v. Towers, 37 Cal. 2d 727, 235 P. 2d 209 (1951).
18 Hardy v. Vial, supra n. 16 at 497.
19 Reckman v. Keiter, 107 Ohio App. 81, 164 N. E. 2d 448 (1959).
20 161 U. S. 483, 16 S. Ct. 631 (1896).
21 Harwood v. McMurtry, 22 F. Supp. 572 (W. D. Ky. 1938); Brewer v. Mel-
lon, 18 F. 2d 168 (D. C. Cir. 1927); Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F. 2d 40 (D. C.
Cir. 1941); Carson v. Behlen, 136 F. Supp. 222 (D. C. R. I. 1955); Laughlin
v. Rosenman, 163 F. 2d 838 (D. C. Cir. 1947); De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 43
Fed. Dig. 425, 24 App. D. C. 167 (1904); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F. 2d 396 (2d Cir.
1926).
22 201 F. 2d 51 (6th Cir. 1952).
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The state courts are not quite as generous in offering un-
qualified immunity to the maliciously impelled official tort-
feasor. The majority of the states do protect their public of-
ficers from suit for official acts which are tainted by malice.
23
However, a few state courts will throw to the wolves the vin-
dictive official who was motivated maliciously.
24
Discretion
Discretion is defined as the power of free decision, of ex-
ercising individual judgment and undirected choice. 25 Officers
vested with the power of discretion are required to exercise
reason in the determination of how, when, or where a given act
shall be done in the pursuance of their official duties. 20 Such an
officer is deemed to function in a quasi-judicial manner and
is therefore immune from civil suit, at least in the absence of
a showing of malice, based upon the public policy discussed
above.27
In Ove Gustavsson v. Floete,2s it was said that government
officers are not personally liable for alleged torts based upon
acts done within the scope of their duties which involve the
exercise of discretion which public policy requires be made with-
out the fear of personal liability.
The construction of a fill in the Missouri River authorized
by Congress in a flood control project and carried out by the
Corps of Engineers was held to be discretionary and the officer
immune.2 9 Failure to provide medical service to an army of-
ficer's wife was held to be immune because the obligation to
23 Note, Public Officers Not Liable for Malicious Acts, 21 Md. L. Rev. 178
(1962).
24 Gilbeau v. Tate, 94 So. 2d 866 (La. App. 1957); Morris v. Nowotny,
supra n. 9; Caton v. Jasper, 303 Ky. 598, 198 S. W. 2d 322 (1946); Pridgen v.
Giles, 267 S. W. 2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Dallas County Flood Con-
trol District v. Fowler, 280 S. W. 2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Peterson v.
George, 168 Neb. 571, 96 N. W. 2d 627 (1959); Eliason v. Funk, 196 A. 2d
887 (Md. App. 1964); Bedrock Foundations v. Brewster, 31 N. J. 124, 155 A.
2d 536 (1959); List v. O'Connor, 21 Ill. App. 2d 399, 158 N. E. 2d 103 (1959);
Campbell v. Jones, 153 Tex. 101, 264 S. W. 2d 425 (1954).
25 Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Discretion, p. 288 (1936).
26 Mid-Central Fish Co. v. U. S., 112 F. Supp. 792 (W. D. Mo. 1953).
27 State to Use of Ferling, 220 Md. 109, 151 A. 2d 137 (1959); Hoffman v.
Hoffman, 61 Ohio App. 371, 22 N. E. 2d 652 (1939); Peterson v. George, 168
Neb. 571, 96 N. W. 2d 627 (1959).
28 299 F. 2d 655 (2d Cir. 1962).
29 Danner v. U. S., 114 F. Supp. 477 (W. D. Mo. 1953).
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provide service was discretionary. " Officers of the Alaska Hous-
ing Authority were said to have exercised discretion in causing
the plaintiff's land to be taken and her building destroyed.3 1
The opening of floodgates by the United States Fish and Wild-
life Service, damaging plaintiff's property, was held to be dis-
cretionary and therefore protected from liability.3 2
Acts which do not require the officer to exercise any judg-
ment at all are termed ministerial, and he may be held liable
for damages resulting from the wrongful performance of such
an act.
3 3
The difficulty inherent in the application of the terms dis-
cretionary and ministerial lies in attempting to determine into
which of these categories a given act shall fall.34 Every act of
an officer requires him to exercise some modicum of discretion
in its performance. There must be some overlapping of minis-
terial and discretionary duties, and the differences between the
two are often so subtle as to render them indistinguishable.3 5
There is no litmus paper test to simplify the distinction.3 6 How-
ever the difficulties existing in the application of these terms are
no more problematic than in other areas of the law where de-
cisions are based upon concepts which are not amenable to pre-
cise definition. 37
Historical Development
The doctrine of immunity as applied to governmental of-
ficers is not as hoary with age as other legal doctrines; however,
it can be said to have come over on the Mayflower. Absolute
immunity arising out of judicial proceedings existed at least as
early as 1608 in England.3S Absolute legislative privilege dates
back to 1399.39
30 Denny v. U. S., 171 F. 2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948).
3' Bridges v. Alaska Housing Authority, 375 P. 2d 696 (Alaska 1962).
32 Olson v. U. S., 93 F. Supp. 150 (N. W. D., N. D. 1950).
33 Somers v. Osterheld, 335 Mass. 24, 138 N. E. 2d 370 (1956); 67 C. J. S.,
Officers § 127; 43 Am. Jur., Public Officers § 274.
34 Dick, Federal Officer's Liability for Damage Done to Property Pursuant
to Statutory Authority, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1344 (1940).
35 Jarrett v. Wills, 235 Ore. 51, 383 P. 2d 995 (1963).
36 Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, supra n. 28.
37 Jarrett v. Wills, supra n. 35.
38 Cited in Phelps v. Dawson, supra n. 4.
39 Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation, Legislative and Executive,
10 Columbia L. Rev. 131 (1910).
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Apparently the earliest English case dealing squarely with
the issue of immunity outside the legislative and judicial
branches in Sutton v. Johnson,40 decided in 1786, where a naval
commander-in-chief was extended the protection of executive
immunity for maliciously causing the captain of a warship to be
arrested and court martialed. The decision was later reversed
because of lack of jurisdiction. Chalterton v. Sec'y of State4'
marked the active birth of executive immunity in England, and
was closely followed in this country by Spalding v. Vilas42 in
1896. However, the courts of the United States did not depend
entirely upon England to blaze a trail. Cases dealing with the
doctrine in this country can be found from 1802 through to the
present.4 3
Trends
The issues of scope of authority and duty, malice, ulterior
motives, and discretion are considerations greatly affecting the
doctrine of immunity of government officers. Does this immunity
apply to every officer from the lowest to the highest echelon?
Where do the courts draw the line in terms of hierarchy?
The rule as it originally developed was limited to cabinet
members, department heads and judges,44 although it had its
genesis in actions against judicial officers.45 At an early date
the rule was extended to protect legislative and administrative
officers. 40 Since Spalding v. Vilas the federal courts have in-
cluded many inferior executive positions within the protec-
tion of the principle, while the state courts have been more
selective in extending the rule.47
Federal Officers
The cases clearly indicate a definite trend in the federal
courts to extend the doctrine of immunity to lower government
officers, no matter what their rank,48 dating back to 1938:
40 Cited in Barr v. Matteo, supra n. 15.
41 Chatterton v. Secretary of State, 2 Q. B. 89 (1895).
42 Supra, n. 20.
43 Bershad v. Wood, 290 F. 2d 714 (9th Cir. 1961).
44 Gamage v. Peal, 217 F. Supp. 384 (N. D. Calif. 1962).
45 Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (U. S. 1871).
46 Spalding v. Vilas, supra n. 20.
47 Montgomery v. Philadelphia, 393 Pa. 178, 140 A. 2d 100 (1958).
48 Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A. 2d 841 (1962).
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During recent years however, a trend is definitely observ-
able extending the application of the rule to minor execu-
tive officers. It is obvious that the effect of this trend is to
cut down proportionately the scope of the general rule which
makes officials liable for tortious injuries and which denies
to them the immunity of the sovereign.4 9
The courts have said that the immunity of a government
official does not depend upon rank, but upon the "nature of the
function" exercised. Should the officer act beyond the scope
of his authority, he is and should be liable; otherwise the im-
munity of the minor government official is well established.50
Recent cases have repeatedly mentioned, and overwhelm-
ingly confirmed the extension of the immunity doctrine from the
higher to the lesser ranks,51 and were preceded by numerous
cases which indicated the trend.5 2
In Hartline v. Clary,5 the briefs of both plaintiff and de-
fendant conceded that judicial officers, quasi-judicial officers,
judges, prosecuting attorneys, executive and ministerial officers
of the government are immune from civil suit for acts committed
by them in the performance of their duties, and these con-
cessions were confirmed by the court in its official opinion.
Immunity has been extended to such minor officers as a
postal inspector,5 4 agents of the Internal Revenue Service,5 5 a
49 Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F. 2d 135, 142 (D. C., C. A. 1938).
50 O'Campo v. Hardisty, 262 F. 2d 621 (9th Cir. 1958).
51 Eliason v. Funk, supra n. 24. Extension of the rule is to be particularly
noted in the federal courts; Carr v. Watkins, supra n. 48. Recognizing, but
refusing to accept the extension of immunity to government officers no
matter what their rank; Bedrock Foundations v. Brewster, supra n. 24. Ju-
dicial immunity has been extended to lesser administrative officials who are
called upon to exercise discretion; O'Campo v. Hardisty, supra n. 50. It is
well established that minor officials are within the scope of immunity;
Craig v. Doak, 171 A. 2d 259 (Mun. App., D. C., 1961). The court recognizes
the trend to extend immunity to lower officers, but chooses not to so act in
this case; Cooper v. O'Connor, supra n. 49. A forerunner, mentioning a
trend toward extending immunity to lower government officers; Harwood v.
McMurtry, supra n. 21. The extended rule now reaches to subordinate
government officers who are acting within their scope of duty; Barr v.
Matteo, supra n. 15. A landmark case in extending immunity to lower gov-
ernment officers; Hartline v. Clary, 141 F. Supp. 151 (E. D. S. C. 1956);
Gamage v. Peal, supra n. 44. Extends the rule of immunity by implication,
stating that it is no longer confined to cabinet members, judges, or depart-
ment heads.
52 Handler and Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation; Suits
Against Government Executive Officials, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 44 (1960).
53 141 F. Supp. 151 (E. D. S. C. 1956).
54 Kelly v. Dunne, 230 F. Supp. 969 (D. C. Mass. 1964).
55 Bershad v. Wood, supra n. 43; Harwood v. McMurtry, supra n. 21; Hart-
line v. Clary, supra n. 53; O'Campo v. Hardisty, supra n. 50.
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deputy marshal,5" government contract inspectors,5 7 a naval
officer,58 the dietician in a V. A. hospital,5 9 a psychiatrist em-
ployed by the government, 0 and federal game wardens."'
The courts, in pursuing this policy of extension, have not
done so without some misgivings. The dissenting opinion in one
case condemns the entire doctrine of immunity, stating that "it
rests upon a rotten foundation, and should be placed in the
judicial garbage can where it belongs." 02 In another case, the
court mentions that the doctrine has been extended to the point
where "many feel that the delicate balance is in danger of being
upset." However the opinion then goes on to confirm and even
further extend the doctrine.6 3
The job of governments is to govern, and that can only be
accomplished in so large and complex a structure as our federal
system by a delegation and redelegation of responsibility. The
courts have justly concluded that they cannot determine that
one act is less important than another merely because its per-
formance is in the hands of one who stands low on the govern-
mental ladder of rank.64
The growth of our governmental activities has long since pre-
vented the head of a department from performing the many
activities and duties within its sphere. Of necessity there
must be a delegation of authority. And when the act done
by a subordinate official occurs in the course of official duty
of a person clothed with authority and subject to the duty
to act, it is the act of the department, just as though per-
formed by the head of the department. Thus the same rea-
son for immunity from civil liability exists with respect to
the acts of a subordinate official done in the exercise of his
or her official functions. 5
56 Phelps v. Dawson, 97 F. 2d 339 (8th Cir. 1938).
57 Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, supra n. 28.
58 Miles v. McGrath, 4 F. Supp. 603 (Md. 1933).
59 Carson v. Behlen, supra n. 21.
60 Blitz v. Boog, 328 F. 2d 596 (2d Cir. 1964); Taylor v. Glotfelty, supra n.
22.
61 Hughes v. Johnson, 305 F. 2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962). For further list of offi-
cers who have been held to be protected by the immunity doctrine see
James Jr., Tort Liability for Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 610 (1955).
62 Hardy v. Vial, supra n. 16.
63 O'Campo v. Hardisty, supra n. 50.
64 Barr v. Matteo, supra n. 15.
65 Carson v. Behlen, supra n. 21 at 224.
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State Officers
The states are more loath to extend the doctrine, and show
a tendency to be selective in determining what officer and which
acts are to be protected.0 They adhere closely to the rule that
immunity from civil liability is limited to high executive officers,
judges, and legislators. 7 The state courts recognize the cur-
rent trend in the federal courts, but the majority are not in-
clined to follow suit so wholeheartedly., s For example, many
officers will not be protected, because the act was done ma-
liciously and is therefore no longer within the scope of the of-
ficer's authority. 9 Unlike comparable federal officers, a minor
state official will be held more strictly liable for the damages
resulting from the negligent or erroneous performance of a
purely ministerial act.70 In a typical case, a court clerk was
held liable for negligently issuing a warrant for the arrest of the
plaintiff charging that he failed to pay a parking fine which had
in fact been paid.7 1 The duties of the clerk were ministerial and
he was not entitled to immunity. Nor are the members of such
subordinate legislative bodies as municipal councils or town
councils entitled to absolute immunity, but protection from civil
suit is conditioned on their acting in good faith.72 However, this
holding is not unanimous, and several states do protect the of-
ficers of such legislative bodies with absolute privilege.73
Finally, there are some states that, emulating the federal
courts, do proffer the shelter of unqualified immunity to their
officers who act within the scope of their authority.74 California
60 Montgomery v. Philadelphia, supra n. 47.
67 Yasaki, Civil Liability of Subordinate State Officers Under the Federal
Civil Rights Acts, and the Doctrine of Immunity, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 887
(1956).
68 Craig v. Doak, 171 A. 2d 259 (Mun. App., D. C. 1961).
69 Matson v. Margiotta, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A. 2d 892 (1952).
70 Trum v. Paxton, 329 Mass. 434, 109 N. E. 2d 116 (1952); 67 C. J. S., Of-
ficers § 127.
71 Stine v. Shuttle, 186 N. E. 2d 168 (Ind. App. 1962).
72 Prosser on Torts § 109 (3rd ed. 1964); McClendon v. Coverdale, 203 A. 2d
815 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964).
73 McClendon case, supra n. 72; Larson v. Doner, 32 Ill. App. 2d 471, 178
N. E. 2d 399 (1961); Tanner v. Gault, 20 0. App. 243, 153 N. E. 124 (1925).
74 Morris v. Nowotny, 323 S. W. 2d 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Guilbeau v.
Tate, 94 So. 2d 866 (La. App. 1957); Bedrock Foundations v. Brewster, 31
N. J. 124, 155 A. 2d 536 (1959); Eliason v. Funk, 196 A. 2d 887 (Md. App.
1964); Carr v. Watkins, supra n. 48.
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recognizes the same wide extension of immunity as do the fed-
eral courts, and New York appears to be leaning toward a
similar position.7 5
Conclusion
The extension of the doctrine of immunity, although wide-
spread in the federal courts, cannot be considered unanimously
confirmed in the state courts. It is conjectured that if the cur-
rent trend is to continue the rights of the private citizen will be
greatly imperiled.70 In one dissent, the very public policy upon
which the doctrine rests is challenged by the contention that
not only will the ardor of our public officers not be dampened
by their loss of immunity, but that they are likely to be more
responsive to the wishes of the public and less likely to act ma-
liciously with the Damocletian sword of retribution by civil
suit hanging over their heads.77
However, the public policy underlying the doctrine con-
tinues to be sufficient justification for the judges who administer
and extend it.
75 Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal. 2d 577, 311 P. 2d 494 (1957); White v. Towers, 37
Cal. 2d 727, 235 P. 2d 209 (1951); Mills v. Smith, 355 P. 2d 1064 (Okla. Sup.
Ct. 1960); Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P. 2d 876 (1952); White
v. Brinkman, 23 Cal. App. 2d 307, 73 P. 2d 254 (1937); Gilberg v. Goffi, 21
A. D. 2d 517, 251 N. Y. S. 2d 823 (1964); Segal v. Jackson, 183 Misc. 460, 48
N. Y. S. 2d 877 (1944).
76 Hartline v. Clary, 141 F. Supp. 151 (E. D. S. C. 1956).
77 Sheridan v. Crisona, 198 N. E. 2d 359 (N. Y. 1964).
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